Why a Timetable in Iraq Might Just be Mission Critical

The War in Iraq, now approaching its third birthday, continues to drag on and progress has trickled in slower than some expected and most would hope for. Everyday the headlines are dominated with the latest bombing attack on American soldiers or Iraqi citizens (the significance should not be lost in regards to the fact that I use the term “citizens” in describing Iraqis, a truly laudable accomplishment of the mission over there). And of course, given the way in which the war was sold to the American public and the hubris that infected administration predictions of post-Sadaam Iraq, support has grown stronger, louder and more widespread for a timetable for troop redeployment. But many how countered that a timetable is dangerous because it gives the insurgents a definitive date that they know when the Americans will leave. The logic goes that they will take this as a signal for how long they have to outlast America after which Iraq will be theirs to terrorize unabated.

While this thinking certainly seems reasonable and logically supported, it is nonetheless flawed. A timetable for troop redeployment in Iraq is something that should not be shunned or dismissed. It is actually the better choice between having one and not having one. There are two critical reasons why this is the case. The first is that for Iraqis (and others in the region) that view American presence in the region as occupation, it clearly defines the terminality to American forces in the country. The second reason is implicit in the administration’s language regarding American presence in Iraq mainly that as Iraqi’s stand up, we shall stand down.

However, before delving into these two areas, let me first state that when I say timetable, I do not mean an inflexible one. To have a schedule that does not take into account the current realities of the situation on the ground in Iraq is foolish and lacks foresight and sound judgment.

There are those who view American presence in Iraq through the lens of our presence in other countries such as Germany, Japan, and Saudi Arabia – place where we maintained a military presence long after the ad hoc conflict had subsided. These people view America’s operations in Iraq as part-in-parcel of a geopolitical strategy in the region where we will use the country as a launching pad to exert undue influence in the neighboring countries. A timetable would do much to assuage a certain segment of this body’s concerns. Insurgent leaders claiming that they be necessary to insure the exiting of Iraq would be undercut in their propaganda campaigns.

As we consider what Iraqis standing up and Americans standing down means, it becomes apparent that we have established an inverse relationship between Iraqi force capability and American military presence in the country. In this case, a timetable is dictated by the capacity of Iraqis to defend themselves. Whosoever says that we should not have a timetable for American redeployment is making an implicit argument that we should not have targets for numbers of Iraqis trained and capable of defending their country. And if we don’t have goals as to numbers and by when, then we will have no metrics to measure our progress in Iraq and progress will limp along. President Bush claims to come from the school of business with management skills learned at Harvard Business School and honed in the private sector at Harken and later in the governor’s mansion in Texas. Would he have any goals that were fuzzy, ill-defined, and non-critical?

No, if we are to hasten and achieve success in Iraq, a timetable must be established that is based goals for trained Iraqis by hard deadlines that will dictate the ability to redeploy American forces. And when those deadlines approach, assessments (which can only be made with established targets) must be made as to how progress has gone and what changes in policy, if any, must be made. A timetable will in this way enhance the work we are doing in Iraq, bolster our claims that this is a finite occupation, and undercut the insurgency.